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For the law to be effective, people must obey it (Caldeira, 
1986; Tyler, 2006b). Although the law frequently involves el-
ements of coercion, in practical terms the legal system has, at 
best, a limited ability to compel people to obey the law (e.g., 
Rottman, 2007; Tyler, 2006b). Voluntary acceptance minimizes 
the need for authorities to explain and justify each decision, re-
duces the need to monitor implementation, and limits the ex-
penditure of scarce resources to ensure compliance (e.g., Rob-
inson & Darley, 1997; Tyler, 2006a). 
One area of the criminal justice system where compliance 
is particularly lacking is in individuals’ response to orders to 
appear in court for relatively minor offenses such as traffic of-
fenses, misdemeanors, and low-level felonies. Noncustodial 
criminal defendants often fail to appear for court. This occurs 
for all kinds of mandated appearances: arraignment, pretrial 
(post-arraignment) hearings, trial, and post-trial. Initial (i.e., 
arraignment) failure-to-appear (FTA) rates are particularly 
problematic, because they involve the greatest volume of de-
fendants, most of whom are not detained prior to trial (Gold-
kamp & White, 2006; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). There are 
a number of alternatives to pretrial detention (VanNostrand & 
Keebler, 2009), the most common of which, for minor offenses, 
is simply to release individuals in the community with little or 
no government oversight, placing the burden to appear in court 
entirely on defendants themselves (Goldkamp & White, 2006). 
Not surprisingly, this can result in substantial FTA rates. FTA 
rates vary depending on jurisdiction and offense type, ranging 
from less than 10% (e.g., Cuvelier & Potts, 1997; VanNostrand 
& Keebler, 2009) to as high as 25–30% (e.g., Davis, 2005; Helland 
& Tabarrok, 2004; McGinty, 2000). These failures to appear are 
costly for both the court system and defendants (Levin, Kennel, 
Pellegrino, Simmons, & Surett, 2007; Rosenbaum, Hutsell, Tom-
kins, Bornstein, Herian, & Neeley, in press). For example, de-
fendants can incur an additional charge for failing to appear, 
heightened penalties for the instant offense, issuance of an ar-
rest warrant, and difficulty in obtaining bail. 
Rates for failing to appear are comparatively high for mi-
nority defendants compared to Whites (O’Keefe, 2007; White, 
2006). A possible explanation for this difference is that minor-
ities have been found to have lower levels of trust and con-
fidence in the courts (e.g., National Center for State Courts, 
1999; Rottman, Hansen, Mott, & Grimes, 2003; Rottman & 
Tomkins, 1999), but little work has examined whether these 
racial and ethnic differences might also be associated with 
FTA. The present study explores the relationship among race 
and ethnicity, trust and confidence in the courts, and FTA. 
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Abstract
This article examines the effectiveness of using different kinds of written reminders to reduce misdemeanor defendants’ fail-
ure-to-appear (FTA) rates. A subset of defendants was surveyed after their scheduled court date to assess their perceptions 
of procedural justice and trust and confidence in the courts. Reminders reduced FTA overall, and more substantive remind-
ers (e.g., with information on the negative consequences of FTA) were more effective than a simple reminder. FTA varied de-
pending on several offense and offender characteristics, such as geographic location (urban vs. rural), type of offense, and 
number of offenses. The reminders were somewhat more effective for Whites and Hispanics than for Blacks. Defendants with 
higher institutional confidence and those who felt they had been treated more fairly by the criminal justice system were more 
likely to appear, though the effectiveness of the reminder was greatest among misdemeanants with low levels of trust in the 
courts. The implications for public policy and pretrial services are discussed.
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Using Reminders to Reduce FTA: An Expectancy Theory 
Approach
Following the example set by the medical profession (e.g., 
Larson, Bergman, Heidrich, Alvin, & Schneeweiss, 1982), sev-
eral courts have effectively implemented court reminder pro-
grams designed to reduce FTA rates (Crozier, 2000; O’Keefe, 
2007; White, 2006; see, generally, The Court Brothers, 2010a). 
For example, the Cook County (IL) Juvenile Court’s postcard 
reminder program reduced the FTA rate from 38 to 13% (Cir-
cuit Court of Cook County, 2006). Similarly, an evaluation of 
Coconino County (AZ) showed a reduction in the percent-
age of failures to appear at initial appearance in adult mis-
demeanor cases from over 25 to less than 13% when the de-
fendant was called in advance and reminded of the hearing 
date (White, 2006). Reminder programs in Arapahoe County 
(CO), Jefferson County (CO), and Multnomah County (OR) 
have also increased appearance rates and realized substantial 
labor and financial savings (Arapahoe County Justice Cen-
ter, 2010; Jefferson County Criminal Justice Planning, 2005; 
O’Keefe, 2007), and they show some evidence of a dispropor-
tionate benefit for minorities (O’Keefe, 2007; White, 2006). 
The potential of reminder programs has even spawned a na-
tional reminder call business for courts (The Court Brothers, 
2010b). 
Although the results of reminder programs are promis-
ing, none to our knowledge has been guided by social scien-
tific theory or research methodology to study the matter sys-
tematically—that is, comparing different types of reminders to 
determine which are more or less effective. To make the stron-
gest contribution to both scientific theory building and policy 
development, psycholegal research should draw on relevant 
social scientific theories and research methods (Blumenthal, 
2002; Wiener, 2007). The present study uses principles of expec-
tancy theory (Vroom, 1964) to test the effectiveness of different 
kinds of written reminders. Prehearing reminders can be used 
to manipulate defendants’ expectancies regarding the negative 
consequences of failing to appear, as well as the positive con-
sequences of appearing. Both positive and negative expectan-
cies can motivate choosing one behavioral option over another 
(Vroom, 1964)—here, whether or not to appear in court. 
Although the expected outcomes of court proceedings are 
somewhat unpredictable and idiosyncratic to each case, the 
procedures themselves are relatively standardized. Individu-
als are more likely to accept adverse outcomes and follow un-
wanted directives when they perceive the procedures used to 
arrive at those outcomes as procedurally fair (e.g., Hegtvedt, 
Johnson, Ganem, Waldron, & Brody, 2009; Thibaut & Walker, 
1975; Tyler, 2006a), and when they have high trust and confi-
dence in governmental institutions (e.g., Baum, 2006; Gibson, 
Caldeira, & Spence, 2003, 2005). 
Perceptions of procedural justice have been examined in a 
range of contexts, both inside and outside the courtroom (e.g., 
Murphy, 2008; Tomkins & Applequist, 2008; Tyler, 2007), and 
they have been studied in both experimental and more natu-
ralistic settings (MacCoun, 2005). Studies looking at proce-
dural justice and compliance typically vary (or assess) the 
level of procedural justice in some proceeding, and then mea-
sure its relationship to subsequent compliance (e.g., Barry & 
Tyler, 2009; Murphy, 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008). Other re-
search focuses on individuals’ expectancies of procedural jus-
tice, and measures its relationship to behavioral intentions or 
attitudes (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988). 
In some circumstances, such as court hearings, it is impor-
tant to address individuals’ expectancies early in the process, 
simply because an expectation of low procedural fairness or a 
failure to expect negative sanctions might lead them to avoid 
the court proceeding altogether (i.e., FTA). Thus, the present 
study seeks to manipulate criminal defendants’ expectancies 
prior to attending their first court hearing.
Study Overview and Hypotheses
Previous literature suggests that reminders would re-
duce defendants’ FTA rate, and that reminders incorporat-
ing a substantive message—such as one designed to manip-
ulate positive and/or negative expectancies—would be more 
effective than a simple reminder. The present study tests this 
hypothesis using a two-stage experiment. In Phase 1, defen-
dants were randomly assigned to one of four reminder con-
ditions: (a) a no-reminder or control condition; (b) a reminder-
only condition; (c) a condition in which the reminder also 
makes them aware of negative consequences, in the form of 
possible sanctions, should they fail to appear (reminder-sanc-
tions); and (d) a condition in which the reminder mentions 
sanctions but also highlights positive consequences, in the 
form of the procedural justice elements of voice, neutrality, 
respect, and public interest (reminder-combined). The primary 
dependent variable is whether defendants appear for their 
scheduled court date. 
In Phase 2, we assessed a subset of participants’ trust and 
confidence in the courts and perceptions of procedural justice 
using a survey administered after their scheduled appearance 
(or nonappearance). This allowed for an examination of the 
possible interaction between the reminder manipulation and 
participants’ degree of trust and confidence.
For Phase 1, we predicted a linear effect of the reminder 
manipulation, such that individuals who received the re-
minder-combined postcard would be most likely to comply, 
followed by individuals who received the reminder-sanc-
tions postcard, followed by participants in the reminder-only 
condition, who would be more likely to comply with court 
orders than those who received no reminder. We expected 
that the reminder-sanctions condition would be less effec-
tive than the reminder-combined condition, because some 
research shows that sanctions alone are not a very power-
ful means to get people to obey the law (Robinson & Dar-
ley, 1997). Thus, sanctions—or the threat thereof—should 
be a less efficient means of influencing behavior than other 
tactics, especially expectancies based on a normative ratio-
nale (McAdams, 2000). However, one might also reason that 
members of the studied population—individuals charged 
with breaking the law—would be relatively suspicious about 
expectancies proffered by the court system, especially posi-
tive expectancies related to fair treatment. If so, then the re-
minder-combined condition might be less effective than it 
would be with a nonoffending population. 
We made two hypotheses related to race and ethnicity, 
based on prior research (e.g., O’Keefe, 2007). First, we pre-
dicted a higher FTA rate for minorities than for Whites; sec-
ond, we predicted an interaction between the reminder ma-
nipulation and defendants’ race and ethnicity, such that the 
reminders would be effective for minority defendants but not 
necessarily for White defendants. 
For Phase 2, we hypothesized that trust and confidence 
in the judicial system and defendants’ procedural justice as-
sessments would be greater for defendants who appeared 
in court than for defendants who failed to appear. We also 
predicted lower trust and confidence for minorities than for 
Whites. Finally, we predicted an interaction between the re-
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minder treatment and individuals’ trust and confidence. Spe-
cifically, individuals with high levels of trust and confidence 
would have a high likelihood of complying with court or-
ders, regardless of the treatment level that was administered 
(see, e.g., Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & Rasin-
ski, 1991). The expectancy of sanctions and/or fair treatment, 
created by the reminder manipulation, would exert a stron-
ger effect in individuals with relatively low trust and confi-
dence in the courts. 
Method  
Participants
The sample for Phase 1 consisted of 7,865 misdemeanor de-
fendants from 14 counties in Nebraska. Data collection began 
in March 2009 and continued through May 2010. The selected 
counties included both urban (e.g., Lincoln and Omaha) and 
rural portions of the state. All misdemeanants meeting certain 
eligibility criteria (e.g., age 19 years or older [the age of ma-
jority in Nebraska], type of offense, scheduling of court hear-
ing) were included in the sample. For example, we excluded 
offenses for which defendants could waive their court appear-
ance (appearance in court is not mandatory for waiverable 
offenses, which can be handled by the defendant via mail). 
This included the majority of minor traffic offenses (e.g., sus-
pended license, no proof of insurance) and offenses such as 
disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, open container, and 
so on. We also excluded cases that were entered into the state 
court’s computer system too close to the assigned court date, 
because it limited our ability to send a timely reminder. The 
sample was racially diverse: 69.8% White, 10.7% Hispanic; 
10.1% Black, 6.6% Unknown; 1.6% Native American; 1% Asian 
American; and .2% Other (racial classifications were made by 
the officer issuing the citation).
All of the misdemeanor categories provided for by state 
statute were represented in the sample, with most com-
ing from the relatively severe categories. For example, 30.5% 
of defendants were charged with an alcohol-related misde-
meanor (e.g., first offense driving-under-the-influence charge) 
and an additional 31.0% were charged with violations of city 
ordinances (e.g., injuring or destroying property). Roughly 
one sixth (17.6%) were charged with a Class 1 misdemeanor 
(e.g., carrying a concealed weapon, first offense; failing to 
stop and render aid), with the remainder charged with a Class 
2 (9.3%; e.g., shoplifting $0−$200) or Class 3 misdemeanor 
(11.2%; e.g., minor in possession of alcohol). Four individ-
uals were charged with a Class 3A misdemeanor (0.1%; e.g., 
possession of marijuana, third offense); 21 were charged with 
a Class 4 misdemeanor (0.3%; e.g., possession of marijuana, 
second offense); and five were charged with a Class 5 misde-
meanor (0.1%; e.g., unlawful entry of state park without a park 
permit). For analytical purposes, we combined the latter three 
categories with Class 3 misdemeanors.
A subset of the Phase 1 misdemeanants comprised the 
Phase 2 sample. Specifically, all of the misdemeanants who 
did not appear for their hearing and 20% (randomly se-
lected) of those who appeared were sent a survey prenotifi-
cation one week after their scheduled court hearings alerting 
them to a forthcoming survey (i.e., we followed Dillman’s 
[2007] recommended procedures). Two weeks after the 
scheduled hearing dates, participants were mailed the ac-
tual survey with a $2 bill as an incentive. Replacement sur-
veys were mailed two weeks later if they had not already 
been returned. Surveys were sent to 2,357 individuals—1,538 
to those who appeared for their court dates and 819 who did 
not appear. We received surveys from 335 defendants who 
appeared in court and from 117 who failed to appear (N = 
452). The response rate was 21.6% for participants who ap-
peared in court and 14.5% for those who failed to appear, 
making the overall response rate 19.2%. The demographics 
of the Phase 2 sample were fairly comparable to the Phase 1 
sample, although Whites comprised a slightly larger propor-
tion of Phase 2 respondents (77.6%), and Blacks and Hispan-
ics comprised slightly smaller proportions than in the Phase 
1 sample (7.8% and 5.7%, respectively). 
Materials, Design, and Procedure
Phase 1 — Each defendant in the participating counties was 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions (see Table 1): (a) 
no-reminder or control, (b) reminder-only, (c) reminder-sanctions, 
or (d) reminder-combined. The reminder-only condition consisted 
of a message printed on a postcard reminding the defendant 
that he or she was scheduled to appear in court on a speci-
fied date and time. The reminder-sanctions condition contained 
this information as well as an explanation of the negative con-
sequences of failing to appear. The message in the reminder-
combined condition contained the same information as the re-
minder-sanctions condition and it also emphasized the various 
conceptual components of procedural justice (voice, dignity, 
respect, and public interest) that were attendant to the defen-
dant’s appearance in court. 
We did not include a positive-consequences-only condi-
tion, with no mention of sanctions, because feedback from 
court personnel suggested that it would be unrealistic for 
courts to include the “positive” information without also men-
tioning the “negative” (it would also be potentially unethi-
cal, because a positive-only condition might imply an absence 
of penalties for FTA). The reminders were in a bilingual for-
mat (English and Spanish, reverse translated for accuracy) and 
sent by postal mail several days before defendants’ scheduled 
court appearances. If any mailings were returned because of 
an incorrect address, the individual was immediately removed 
from the sample.
The messages in the respective conditions were pre-
tested on a separate sample, to ensure that the manipula-
tions captured the constructs of interest. Pretest participants 
(n = 55) were recruited from the University of Nebraska-Lin-
coln psychology department online study website ( http://
www.experimetrix.com ) and were offered extra credit for 
completing the survey. Participants were asked to imag-
ine that they had been cited for a misdemeanor and had a 
court date scheduled, and then they completed a question-
naire asking several questions about their expectations re-
garding the fairness of the procedure (e.g., “How likely do 
you believe it is that the court [i.e., the judge] would listen 
to your opinions?” “How likely do you believe it is that you 
would be treated in court with dignity and respect?”). They 
were then told to imagine that they had received a reminder 
prior to their court dates (using the language from the re-
minder-only condition), and answered the same questions. 
Then they saw either the reminder-sanctions postcard or a 
reminder describing just the benefits of appearing, followed 
by the reminder-combined condition (with either the nega-
tive or the positive information presented first, counterbal-
anced across participants; as described above, we ultimately 
dropped the “positive-only” condition). Thus, they an-
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swered the same questions for each of four conditions. The 
reminder-combined condition (with the negative sanctions 
presented first) was perceived as significantly fairer than 
both the control condition, t(28) = 3.35, p = .002, d = .55, and 
the reminder-only condition, t(28) = 2.65, p = .013, d = .49. In 
contrast, the reminder-sanctions condition was rated as no 
fairer than either the control or the reminder-only condition, 
t(26)s < 1, ps > .50. These results provided the language for 
the postcard manipulation in the main study. 
Phase 2 — The survey asked participants to rate how much 
various factors affected their decision to appear (or not to ap-
pear) in court on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(very much). They also responded to items assessing confidence 
in the courts (e.g., “Judges in my county do their jobs well”), 
cynicism (e.g., “People in power use the law to control peo-
ple like me”), general trust in governmental institutions (e.g., 
“How often can you trust the U.S. government to do what is 
right?”), obligation to obey the courts (e.g., “I feel I should ac-
cept the decisions of legal authorities”), and dispositional trust 
(e.g., “Generally speaking, do you think most people can be 
trusted?”). These constructs measure discrete aspects of trust 
and confidence (Hamm et al., 2011). Responses were made 
on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) or 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
We also asked three questions of all participants relevant 
to procedural justice (referred to henceforth as general-PJ), in-
quiring about their assessments with the judicial system in 
general regarding its fairness, bias, and the respect with which 
they were treated from the time of their ticket to the time they 
completed the survey, whether or not they appeared in court 
(but excluding their experience with law enforcement person-
nel, such as the officer who issued the ticket). For those who 
appeared for their hearings, we also asked more extensively 
about their procedural justice perceptions regarding their 
court appearances, using an eight-question scale targeting the 
subconstructs of fairness, voice, dignity, and respect (referred 
to henceforth as specific-PJ). Responses were made on 5-point 
scales, ranging from 1 (very unfair) to 5 (very fair) or from 1 
(very respectfully) to 5 (very disrespectfully). Finally, we collected 




FTA rate and case disposition — The baseline (control) 
FTA rate was 12.6%; it was 10.4% across all conditions. For de-
fendants who appeared in court, there were a number of possi-
Table 1. Example of Reminder Postcard (Reminder-Combined Condition). The reminder-only condition contained only the first paragraph, and 
the reminder-sanctions condition contained the first two paragraphs
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ble case dispositions. For all defendants, 78.8% pleaded guilty 
in court, while the charge was dismissed in 11.6% of cases. An 
additional 6.2% pleaded guilty by waiver.1 Only 3.4% of cases 
went to trial; of these, nearly all were bench trials. 
FTA across conditions — The FTA rate varied significantly 
across conditions (see Table 2), χ2(3) = 20.90, p < .001, Φ = .05. 
Post hoc contrasts showed a difference between receiving any 
reminder (9.7% FTA rate) versus the no-reminder control con-
dition, χ2(1) = 14.29, p < .001, Φ = .04. There was also a sig-
nificant difference between the simple reminder and the two 
conditions with more substantive information (i.e., reminder-
sanctions and reminder-combined), χ2(1) = 4.63, p = .031, Φ = 
.03. The FTA rate was slightly higher in the reminder-com-
bined condition than in the reminder-sanction condition, but 
this difference was not statistically significant, χ2(1) = 2.60, p = 
.11, Φ = .03. 
Factors associated with FTA — Secondary analyses fo-
cused on differences in FTA rate as a function of several fac-
tors, specifically (a) defendants’ race and ethnicity, (b) defen-
dant sex, (c) geographic location (specifically, rural vs. urban 
counties), (d) offense type, and (e) number of charges. To ex-
plore these relationships, we estimated a logistic regression 
model with all of these factors as predictors of the overall FTA 
rate as well as reminder condition. The model also included 
the predicted interaction between reminder and race/ethnic-
ity (see Table 3). 
Controlling for these other factors, the effect of the re-
minder manipulation was reduced, but was still marginally 
significant, β = .14, p = .085. This suggests that the reminders 
were still effective, but that FTA was also associated with some 
of the other factors included in the regression model, as dis-
cussed next. We predicted that minorities would have higher 
FTA rates than Whites. The overall FTA (all conditions com-
bined) rate varied as a function of defendant race and ethnic-
ity: White (9.5%) versus Black (16.4%) versus Hispanic (9.4%). 
However, when controlling for sex, location, offense type, and 
number of charges, the effect of race and ethnicity was not sig-
nificant, β = −.09, p = .32. 
The FTA rate also did not differ significantly as a function 
of defendant sex: Male (10.8%) versus Female (9.4%), β = −.10, 
p = .29. The FTA rate varied across geographic locations and 
was higher in urban (12.4%) than rural counties (6.8%), β = .40, 
p < .001. We also examined whether FTA rates differed by the 
type of offense and by the number of charges issued for each 
court hearing. FTA rates differed significantly as a function of 
the type of offense (see Table 4), β = −.18, p < .001. Individuals 
charged with Misdemeanor 2 offenses and violations of city 
ordinances were the most likely to FTA. 
FTA rates also differed significantly depending on the 
number of charges issued on each ticket (coded as 1 vs. 2 or 
more), with the likelihood of FTA increasing with the number 
of citations on the ticket, β = −1.28, p < .001. Only 5.4% of indi-
viduals with one offense failed to appear, whereas 15.4% of in-
dividuals with two or more offenses did not appear. Based on 
the results of this analysis, and in relation to the other analyses 
conducted above, it appears that number of offenses is one of 
the strongest predictors of FTA. 
Differential effectiveness of reminders by race and eth-
nicity — We predicted that the postcard reminders would be 
effective for minorities but not for Whites (i.e., a race by re-
minder interaction). The interaction between race and re-
minder was nonsignificant, β = −.01, p = .80. Thus, the effec-
tiveness of the reminders was essentially comparable for the 
three major racial groups (see Figure 1). However, because 
we predicted an effect for minorities but not for Whites, we 
examined treatment effects for each racial and ethnic group 
separately. 
For Whites, the FTA rate ranged from 11.7 to 8%, depend-
ing on the treatment, a finding that was significant, χ2(3) = 
12.26, p = .007, Φ = .05. Follow-up tests comparing each re-
minder condition to the control condition showed that the re-
minder-sanctions condition was effective, χ2(1) = 10.78, p = 
.001, Φ = .06, as was the reminder-combined condition, χ2(1) 
= 6.21, p = .013, Φ = .05; however, the reminder-only condi-
tion did not greatly reduce FTA among Whites, χ2(1) = 2.94, p 
= .086, Φ = .03. 
For Blacks, the various treatments did not appear to have 
the same effect. The FTA rate for Blacks ranged from 18.7% in 
the control condition to 13.5% in the reminder-sanctions con-
dition, but the omnibus test was not significant, χ2(3) = 3.85, p 
= .28, Φ = .07. For Hispanics, there was a marginally significant 
difference in FTA rate across the conditions, χ2(3) = 6.81, p = 
.078, Φ = .09. As with Whites, the reminder with sanctions had 
the greatest absolute impact on reducing FTA rates, given that 
the FTA rate was reduced to 4.7 from 10.5% in the control con-
dition, χ2(1) = 4.94, p = .026, Φ = .11. The other reminders did 
not significantly reduce FTA below the baseline level among 
Hispanics, χ2(1)s < 2, ps > .5. 
Phase 2
In a previous study, we found that our trust and confi-
dence items could be statistically and conceptually organized 
into four distinct subscales (Hamm et al., 2011): Trust in the 
Courts, Cynicism, General Trust in Institutions, and Obli-
gation to Obey. Here we present data from the Trust in the 
Courts subscale ( = .85), as well as a Total Institutional Confi-
dence measure (combining all four subscales;  = .77), because 
those are most relevant to the present study. Because the con-
struct of Dispositional Trust is conceptually different from a 
person’s perceptions about institutions (i.e., it looks at peo-
ple’s general trust of others), we examined this construct sep-
arately ( = .78). 
Table 2. Failure to Appear Rate by Experimental Condition
                                                                 Appeared for court
Reminder postcard treatment   No  Yes  Total 
Control  12.6%  87.4%  2095
Reminder-only  10.9%  89.1%  1889
Reminder-sanctions  8.3%  91.7%  1901
Reminder-PJ  9.8%  90.2%  1980
Total  10.4%  89.6%  7865
1. We were unable to obtain disposition data on approximately 16% of the cases. Also, as noted above, all waiverable offenses and traffic cases 
were removed from our sample before reminder postcards were mailed to defendants, which raises the question of how cases in the sample 
could be disposed of by waiver. Most of the cases disposed through a waiver were originally nonwaiverable cases that were amended by the 
courts. Finally, a number of waiverable cases at the city level appear to have been inadvertently included in the sample because our screening 
criteria were based on state statutes rather than city ordinances.
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We also measured defendants’ perceptions of procedural 
justice. We asked all defendants three general questions 
about courts’ fairness, bias, and respect related to the judi-
cial system in general (general-PJ). We also asked the defen-
dants who appeared for their hearings (n = 251) eight ques-
tions about their case-specific procedural justice perceptions 
(specific-PJ). Alpha levels for both PJ scales were fairly high 
(.92 and .82, respectively). There was a strong relationship 
between the two sets of questions, each treated as a scale, 
r(324) = .66, p < .01. 
Trust and confidence, PJ, and FTA — We hypothesized 
that those defendants who appeared for their hearings would 
indicate greater levels of trust and confidence and have greater 
levels of perceived procedural justice than those who did not 
appear. Defendants who appeared in court for their hearing 
had significantly greater Total Institutional Confidence scores 
(M = 3.24) than those who did not appear (M = 3.02), F(1, 445) = 
7.82, p = .005, ηp2 = .02, as well as greater Trust in the Courts 
scores (M = 3.30 for appearers; M = 3.04 for nonappearers), 
F(1, 441) = 7.78, p = .006, ηp2 = .02. Additionally, there was a re-
lationship between perceptions of (general) procedural jus-
tice and appearance, F(1, 438) = 6.61, p = .01, ηp2 = .02, such that 
those who appeared for their hearings perceived greater levels 
of procedural justice in their overall experience with the crimi-
nal justice system (M = 3.53 vs. M = 3.23). 
We also discovered strong relationships between the var-
ious constructs of interest. For example, the correlation be-
tween Total Institutional Confidence and general-PJ was sig-
nificant r(440) = .59, p < .001, as was the correlation between 
Trust in the Courts and general-PJ, r(438) = .65, p < .001. Fur-
thermore, among those who appeared for court, there were 
strong relationships between Total Institutional Confidence 
and specific-PJ, r(324) = .57, p < .001, and between Trust in the 
Courts and specific-PJ, r(323) = .64, p < .001. 
We next examined the potential relationships between the 
reminder manipulation and perceptions of general and spe-
cific procedural justice. The results showed no effect in either 
case, F(3, 436) = 1.15, p = .33, ηp2 = .01, and F(3, 320) = .44, p = .72, 
ηp2 = .00, respectively. 
We hypothesized that there would be a race and ethnicity 
effect, with Whites having greater trust and confidence than 
minorities. Comparing Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, there 
were significant differences on a number of constructs re-
lated to trust (see Table 5). Whites had greater dispositional 
trust than both Blacks and Hispanics, F(2, 401) = 9.20, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .04. Notably, we also found that there was a significant 
difference across the three racial and ethnic categories on To-
tal Institutional Confidence, F(2, 402) = 3.71, p = .025, ηp2 = .02, 
and Trust in the Courts, F(2, 398) = 4.34, p = .014, ηp2 = .02. Post 
hoc tests showed that on both variables, the significant differ-
ence was driven largely by the gap between Whites and Blacks 
Table 3. Regression Results: Factors Associated with Failure to Appear
Variable  β (SE)  Wald  Exp(b)  95% CI
Reminder treatment  .14* (.08)  2.96  1.14  [0.98, 1.34]
Race  –.09 (.09)  1.00  .91  [0.77, 1.09]
Reminder treatment by race  –.01 (.05)  .06  .99  [0.90, 1.09]
Gender  –.10 (.09)  1.13  .91  [0.76, 1.08]
Urban/rural  .41** (.11)  13.44  1.50  [1.21, 1.86]
Offense type  –.18** (.03)  42.71  .83  [0.79, 0.88]
Number of offenses  –1.28** (.10)  172.86  .28  [0.23, 0.34]
Constant  4.48 (.34)  177.47  87.90
Cox & Snell R2 = .044.
* p = .085 ; ** p = .001
Table 4. Failure to Appear Rate by Offense Type
   Reminder Reminder Reminder 
 All conditions  Control  -only –sanctions –combined
  FTA  FTA  FTA  FTA  FTA
Offense type rate  n rate  n rate  n rate  n rate  n
Class 1 7.6 1377 7.3 358 8.2 365 7.0 330 8.0 324
Class W (alcohol) 9.4 2389 9.7 628 11.1 96 7.2 567 9.4 598
Class 2 13.8 732 18.9 212 11.7 145 10.5 191 13.0 184
Class 3/3A/4/5 8.4 908 10.2 254 8.5 213 6.8 220 7.7 2212
City ordinance 12.9 2424 17.5 636 13.2 560 10.1 587 10.6 641
FTA rates are percentages. The Method section gives examples of each offense type.
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rather than any differences between Whites and Hispanics, or 
between Blacks and Hispanics. Together, the findings suggest 
that although Blacks differed from Whites on all measures of 
trust and confidence, Hispanics were closer to Blacks on some 
measures, but closer to Whites on others. 
Finally, we hypothesized that the level of trust and confi-
dence would interact with the reminder manipulation, such 
that the reminder would be more effective for defendants rel-
atively low in trust. We conducted a binary logistic regression 
to examine this hypothesis, with appearance as the dependent 
variable. Because the Phase 1 analyses showed that the largest 
effect was for receiving any reminder versus the control con-
dition, we dichotomized the reminder variable (i.e., any re-
minder vs. none); trust in the courts was categorized as low, 
medium, or high; and we controlled for participants’ race us-
ing dummy variables.
The results (see Figure 2) revealed that, consistent with the 
results reported above, higher levels of trust in the courts were 
associated with a greater probability of appearing, β = 0.79, p 
= .008, Exp(b) = 2.21, Exp(b) CI [1.23, 3.94]. As in the Phase 1 
analysis of the full sample, there was also an effect of the re-
minder manipulation, such that the FTA rate was lower for 
those who received a reminder than for those who did not, β 
= 1.32, p = .045, Exp(b) = 3.73, Exp(b) CI [1.03, 13.51]. Support-
ing our hypothesis, there was also a significant interaction, β 
= −.70, p = .039, Exp(b) = .50, Exp(b) CI [.26, .97]. As Figure 2 
shows, the reminder marginally reduced FTA for those with 
low trust in the courts (p = .05, one-tailed), but it did not affect 
FTA for those with medium (p = .28) or high (p = .10) trust. Put 
another way, the reminder eliminated differences in FTA as a 
function of degree of trust in the courts. 
Reasons for (non)appearance — We also examined why 
defendants did or did not appear for their court appear-
ance (see Table 6). The factors that participants judged most 
important in their deciding to appear for court were want-
ing to avoid additional offenses for FTA or additional pen-
alties, or feeling they should obey the law. In contrast, de-
fendants who did not appear rated scheduling conflicts as 
having the greatest effect on their decision. Notably, nonap-
pearers did not seem to view forgetting their hearing date, 
family conflicts, or fear of the outcome as major reasons for 
their nonappearance. 
Discussion 
The Phase 1 findings replicate previous research in show-
ing that a reminder effectively reduces the FTA rate. A more 

















sanctions for FTA, was more beneficial than a simple re-
minder, suggesting that the expectation of negative con-
sequences modified defendants’ behavior (Vroom, 1964). 
However, inclusion of a more positive expectancy message, 
derived from procedural justice principles, did not yield ad-
ditional benefit. Indeed, there was some indication that the re-
minder with only negative, threatening information (i.e., the 
reminder-sanctions condition) was the most effective method 
of reducing FTA rates for all three racial groups we exam-
ined (the sanctions condition reduced the FTA rate by 3.7% for 
Whites, 5.2% for Blacks, and 5.8% for Hispanics; these reduc-
tions were statistically significant for Whites and Hispanics, 
but not for Blacks). 
The effectiveness of the reminder with sanctions was sur-
prising, inasmuch as research shows that sanctions alone are 
not a very powerful means to get people to obey the law (Rob-
inson & Darley, 1997). In addition to this finding, the analysis 
of participants’ reasons for (non)appearance likewise showed 
a greater emphasis on instrumental than on normative con-
cerns, especially among nonappearers. It is possible that the 
decision-making calculus is different in an offending popula-
tion, and that the threat of sanctions in particular, and instru-
mental considerations generally, are particularly effective for 
this group—perhaps due to greater lifetime experience with 
clear behavioral contingencies, especially of a punitive nature, 
than with more abstract, normative reasoning. 
FTA differed as a function of demographic and offense 
characteristics, especially geographic location (urban vs. ru-
ral), offense type, and number of charges. The difference be-
tween urban and rural communities likely reflects the greater 
sense of anomie and disconnectedness in urban centers, com-
pared to more closely knit rural settings (Curry, 2000). The 
FTA rate did not differ across race and ethnicity when con-
trolling for these other factors. Racial and ethnic minorities are 
Figure 1. FTA rates by race and reminder condition.
Table 5. Trust and Confidence and Procedural Justice Scale Means by Race and Ethnicity
 Whites   Blacks  Hispanics
Scale Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD F  p 
Trust in the Courts 3.26a 0.84 2.79b 0.91 3.24a,b 0.87 4.34 .014
Total Institutional Confidence 3.20a 0.70 2.84b 0.81 3.15a,b 0.66 3.71 .025
Dispositional Trust 2.90a 0.80 2.34b 1.02 2.44b 0.89 9.20 .000
General Procedural Justice 3.35 1.04 3.13 1.31 2.99 0.98 0.23 .795
Specific Procedural Justice 3.47 1.04 3.38 1.13 3.35 1.03 1.34 .264
Within a row, means with different superscripts—a and b—differ significantly, p < .05

















quite diverse, and it is problematic to focus on race without 
consideration of variables that might covary along with race 
(e.g., Covington, 1995; Hitlin, Brown, & Elder, 2007). Further-
more, the fact that 54.9% of the Hispanic sample came from 
rural areas might suggest that rural Hispanics are particularly 
aware of the sanctions associated with FTA. The data on of-
fense type and number of charges suggest that FTA is more 
likely for more serious cases (i.e., more severe offenses, multi-
ple charges; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). 
The most striking finding from Phase 2 was that trust 
and confidence correlated significantly with court appear-
ances. This finding is consistent with other demonstrations 
that trust and confidence are an important construct for un-
derstanding compliance with the law generally (Murphy, 
2008; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). It is also relevant to understand-
ing racial and ethnic differences in compliance (e.g., Brooks 
& Jeon-Slaughter, 2001; Tyler, 2001). Minorities tend to have 
less trust in various authorities than Whites (e.g., the med-
ical system as well as the legal system; see Corbie-Smith, 
Thomas, & St. George, 2002). In our dataset, the race effect 
was not uniform: Blacks and Hispanics were similar in dispo-
sitional trust (and different from Whites), but Hispanics re-
sembled Whites in their confidence in the courts and total in-
stitutional confidence. Hispanics were also similar to Whites 
in FTA, suggesting that situation-specific trust and confi-
dence measures may be better predictors of racial and eth-
nic differences in compliance than more stable, dispositional 
measures. Other research has similarly found that Hispan-
ics are intermediate between Whites and Blacks in their at-
titudes toward legal authorities, such as police (Weitzer & 
Tuch, 2006). 
We also found support for the expected interaction be-
tween the reminder manipulation and trust in the courts, with 
evidence that a reminder was most effective for defendants 
relatively low in trust. Indeed, the relationship between trust 
in the courts and (non)appearance disappeared when defen-
dants received a reminder. Thus, reminders have the potential 
to equalize appearance rates for defendants who vary in their 
attitudes toward the criminal justice system.
Limitations and Future Directions
One limitation of this study is whether the message in the 
reminder-combined condition was sufficiently potent. Pre-
testing of the postcard manipulation indicated it was signif-
icantly different from the other postcard reminders. How-
ever, the pretesting was done with a college student sample. 
Compared to nonoffenders, actual defendants might have 
been more skeptical about the positive aspects of the message 
(i.e., voice, respect, etc.), particularly if they had had bad ex-
periences with the criminal justice system in the past. Indeed, 
there was evidence of substantial cynicism in the Phase 2 sam-
ple, with those failing to appear being significantly more cyni-
cal than those who appeared.
It is unclear how to overcome this limitation, as an even 
stronger message would likely be met with the same cynicism. 
It is possible that a telephone reminder from court personnel 
emphasizing positive expectancies could accomplish this goal, 
but it would be offset by the substantial additional investment 
of labor and time. Prerecorded telephone reminders are po-
tentially more efficient, but any added benefit of a phone re-
minder might only accrue from a “live” individual who could 
provide a more personal touch and also answer questions. Fu-
ture research should directly compare print versus phone re-
minders, taking into account the costs as well as the benefits of 
reduced FTA (Rosenbaum et al., in press). 
Figure 2. FTA rates as a function of trust in the courts and reminder 
treatment.
Table 6. Reasons for Appearance or Nonappearance
Reason  Mean  SD
Reason for appearance
I wanted to avoid an additional offense (for failure to appear) on my record.  4.60  1.02
I wanted to avoid additional penalties.  4.59  .98
I felt I should obey the law. 4.38  1.05
The system depends on compliance from people like me.  3.73  1.37
I wanted to tell my side of the story.  3.16  1.62
Reason for nonappearance
I had scheduling conflicts.  2.77  1.81
I had work conflicts.  2.39  1.66
I had transportation difficulty.  2.07  1.59
I forgot about the hearing date.  1.89  1.50
I had family conflicts (e.g., childcare conflicts).  1.84  1.44
I was afraid of what the outcome would be if I went to court.  1.72  1.20
The scale ranged from 1 = affected not at all,  to 5 = affected very much.  
Ns ranged 317–325 for appearers and 109–113 for nonappearers.
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One alternative solution is simply to accept that negative 
messages might be more effective at changing expectancies 
and inducing desirable behavior in this context than positive 
messages. For example, recent field experiments have shown 
that shame can work as a potentially powerful “commitment 
device” that motivates people to act prosocially, work toward 
long-term strategies, and engage in civic activities (deHooge, 
Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008; Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 
2010). Perhaps lessons from such field experiments can inform 
future efforts to understand compliance with both civic duties 
and legal obligations. 
In addition to these limitations to the reminder manipula-
tion, there were limitations to the Phase 2 survey. For example, 
it did not include measures of perceived outcome favorability 
or outcome fairness, which are themselves important determi-
nants of perceived procedural fairness (Bornstein & Dietrich, 
2007; Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003). In measuring 
procedural fairness only after the court hearing—due to the 
close proximity of the scheduling process to the actual hearing 
dates—it was impossible to measure positive expectancies be-
fore the court date; this is an important limitation that should 
be addressed by future research. Nonetheless, a large major-
ity (84.4%) of participants correctly reported that they had re-
ceived (and presumably read) a reminder postcard. This does 
not show whether the manipulation actually affected their ex-
pectancies, but in combination with the finding that the re-
minder information about negative consequences affected ap-
pearance rates, it does suggest that participants processed the 
manipulation as intended. 
Future research should also extend the racial and eth-
nic findings of the present study. The sample contained too 
few Native Americans, despite being double the statewide 
percentage, as well as too few Asian Americans, to address 
FTA in these groups. Larger-scale research could target ar-
eas in states with large populations of Native Americans and 
Asian Americans. On the other hand, defendants from the ru-
ral counties in our sample contained a substantial number of 
Hispanics (16.6%). This diversity provides valuable informa-
tion about rural Hispanics in the United States, because there 
is a general lack of research on this population, which makes 
up an increasing proportion of rural populations across the 
United States (Kandel & Cromartie, 2004). 
Finally, future research should address the effectiveness 
of reminders at reducing FTA among felony defendants. Fel-
ony defendants are less likely than misdemeanor defendants 
to have the opportunity to FTA, because they are often in 
custody; nonetheless, many felony defendants awaiting trial 
are released on bond. On the one hand, they might be more 
likely to appear, because the penalty for FTA (e.g., forfeited 
bail) is potentially greater. On the other hand, they might be 
less likely to appear, because the prospect of a stiffer sen-
tence if they are tried and convicted could give them greater 
incentive to flee. Our finding that defendants with more 
charges—and hence stiffer potential penalties—were less 
likely to appear suggests that this latter expectation is more 
likely.
Implications for Criminal Justice Policy and Practice
Despite these limitations, the study has important impli-
cations for criminal justice policy and practice, such as im-
proving system efficiencies and cost savings through better 
compliance, improving criminal defendants’ perceptions of 
the courts, and reducing racial and ethnic disparities in the 
criminal justice system. FTA rates vary widely across juris-
dictions, but even lower-end estimates in the 10% range (e.g., 
VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009)—which are consistent with 
the overall FTA rate in the present sample (12.6% in the con-
trol condition)—are costly for both defendants and the court 
system as a whole (Levin et al., 2007). Reducing FTA rates, 
by even a few percentage points, can have significant finan-
cial and labor savings (O’Keefe, 2007; Rosenbaum et al., in 
press). Another benefit of lower FTA rates might be addi-
tional revenue in the form of fines collected from defendants 
who do appear. 
Knowing which types of misdemeanants are most likely to 
FTA—such as those in urban locales, with multiple charges, or 
cited for certain offenses—has implications for how to allocate 
pretrial services most efficiently. The present findings sug-
gest that targeting defendants with multiple charges or in ur-
ban centers using a reminder program would yield the biggest 
“bang for the buck.” The observation that the threat of sanc-
tions is especially effective in reducing FTA in the context of 
misdemeanor level offenses could be used to reduce FTA in 
other contexts, such as reducing the number of citizens who 
do not respond to their jury summons (Seltzer, 1999), or de-
creasing failure to pay child support. 
The findings can also help in developing programs that bet-
ter estimate the impact that various court interventions will 
have on reducing FTA. The literature on pretrial service pro-
grams’ ability to reduce FTA and to ensure community safety 
is relatively small. In addition to the utility for practitioners in 
the implementation of programs, being able to quantify the 
impact of pretrial service program interventions also improves 
the predictive power of pretrial risk assessment instruments, 
such as those that calculate latent risk (Bhati, 2010). 
In the present study, defendants who appeared for court 
had greater trust in the courts and perceived that they were 
treated with greater fairness and respect from the time of their 
ticket to the time they completed the survey, compared to non-
appearers. Trust and confidence in legal institutions, which is 
closely related to, yet arguably distinct from, procedural jus-
tice (Rottman, 2007; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b), has been identified 
by both researchers (e.g., Benesh, 2006; Rottman et al., 2003; 
Tyler, 2006b) and members of the judiciary (e.g., O’Connor, 
1999) as important. Efforts to increase trust and confidence—
especially in populations likely to offend—could potentially 
yield lower FTA rates (the observed correlation between 
trust/confidence and appearance does not, of course, neces-
sarily imply a causal relationship). 
Outreach efforts by the courts are one way to accomplish 
this goal (National Center for State Courts, 2005). Indeed, 
when it comes to reducing the overrepresentation of minori-
ties in the criminal justice system, community-based outreach 
efforts—such as investing resources in local institutions and 
social services—are likely to be more effective than “law-and-
order” measures at increasing trust in the courts and other 
governmental institutions among groups, such as African 
Americans, with relatively low trust (Roberts, 2004; Weitzer 
& Tuch, 2006). Increased trust, then, would be associated with 
greater compliance. 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrates that it is possible to reduce the 
risk of FTA with a postcard reminder system. Substantive re-
minders—that is, those with information about possible sanc-
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tions—were more effective than a simple reminder. FTA rates 
varied across a number of offender characteristics, such as 
geographic location (rural vs. urban), offense type, and num-
ber of charges. FTA was highest for Blacks, but this differ-
ence was not statistically significant when controlling for these 
other factors. Reminders were somewhat less effective for 
Blacks than for Whites and Hispanics.
Misdemeanor defendants who appeared in court had 
more confidence in the courts and a greater sense of proce-
dural justice than defendants who did not appear. There was 
evidence that the reminder manipulation’s effectiveness var-
ied as a function of defendants’ level of trust and confidence, 
suggesting that raising trust and confidence could be rea-
sonably expected to reduce FTA. Overall, the present study 
shows promise that there are ways of ameliorating the costly 
problem of FTA.
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